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The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966 were an anti-communist purge following a failed coup of the 30 September Movement in Indonesia. The most widely accepted estimates are that more than 500,000 people were killed. The purge was a pivotal event in the transition to the "New Order" and the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a political force. The upheavals led to the downfall of President Sukarno and the commencement of Suharto's three-decade presidency. The failed coup released pent-up communal hatreds which were fanned by the Indonesian Army, which quickly blamed the PKI. Communists were purged from political, social, and military life, and the PKI itself was banned. The massacres began in October 1965, in the weeks following the coup attempt, and reached their peak over the remainder of the year before subsiding in the early months of 1966. They started in the capital, Jakarta, and spread to Central and East Java and, later, Bali. Thousands of local vigilantes and army units killed actual and alleged PKI members. Although killings occurred across Indonesia, the worst were in the PKI strongholds of Central Java, East Java, Bali, and northern Sumatra. It is possible that over one million people were imprisoned at one time or another. Sukarno's balancing act of "Nasakom" (nationalism, religion and communism) had been unravelled. His most significant pillar of support, the PKI, had been effectively eliminated by the other two pillars—the army and political Islam; and the army was on the way to unchallenged power. In March 1967, Sukarno was stripped of his remaining power by Indonesia's provisional Parliament, and Suharto was named Acting President. In March 1968, Suharto was formally elected president. The killings are skipped over in most Indonesian history textbooks and have received little introspection by Indonesians. Satisfactory explanations for the scale and frenzy of the violence have challenged scholars from all ideological perspectives. The possibility of a return to similar upheavals is cited as a factor in the "New Order" administration's political conservatism and tight control of the political system. Vigilance against a perceived communist threat remained a hallmark of Suharto's three-decade presidency. Despite a consensus at the highest levels of the American and British governments that it would be necessary "to liquidate Sukarno," as related in a CIA memorandum from 1962,〔. notes that, prior to the mid-1950s, by which time the relationship was in definite trouble, the US actually had, via the CIA, developed excellent contacts with Sukarno.〕 and the existence of extensive contacts between anti-communist army officers and the US military establishment (including the training of over 1,200 officers, "including senior military figures," by the US military, and also providing weapons and economic assistance〔http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3605665?urlappend=%3Bseq=440〕〔Macaulay, Scott (17 February 2014). (The Act of Killing Wins Documentary BAFTA; Director Oppenheimer’s Speech Edited Online ). ''Filmmaker.'' Retrieved 12 May 2015.〕), the CIA denies active involvement in the killings. It was later revealed that the American government provided extensive lists of communists to Indonesian death squads.〔〔〔〔 A top-secret CIA report stated that the massacres "rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s."〔David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L. H. McCormack (2007). ''(The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? (International Humanitarian Law). )'' Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 9004156917 pp. (80–81 ).〕 ==Background== Support for Sukarno's presidency under his "Guided Democracy" depended on his forced and unstable "Nasakom" coalition between the military, religious groups, and communists. The rise in influence and increasing militancy of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and Sukarno's support for it, was a serious concern for Muslims and the military, and tension grew steadily in the early and mid-1960s.〔Schwarz (1994), pp. 16–18〕 The third-largest communist party in the world,〔cf with Weiner (2007) p.259〕 the PKI had approximately 300,000 cadres and a full membership of around two million.〔Cribb (1990), p. 41.〕 The party's assertive efforts to speed up land reform frightened those who controlled the land and threatened the social position of Muslim clerics.〔Schwarz (1994), pp. 17, 21.〕 Sukarno required government employees to study his Nasakom principles as well as Marxist theory. Sukarno had met with Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People's Republic of China. After this meeting he decided to create a militia, called a Fifth Force, which he intended to control personally. He ordered weapons from China to be used to equip this Fifth Force. He declared in a speech that he favoured revolutionary groups whether they were nationalist, religious or communist stating "I am a friend of the Communists, because the Communists are revolutionary people.〔President Sukarno, speech on independence day, 17 August 1964〕" Sukarno said at a Non-Aligned summit meeting in Cairo (October 1964) that his current purpose was to drive all of Indonesian politics to the left and thereby to neutralise the "reactionary" elements in the army that could be dangerous for the revolution.〔Andrew John Rotter (Edt.), ''Light at the and of the tunnel'', p.273, Rowman & Littlefield Publ., 2010 ,ISBN 9780742561335〕 Sukarno's international policies increasingly reflected his rhetoric. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Indonesian killings of 1965–66」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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